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Abstract— This article analyzes the procedure for the initial employment of research assistants in 
Turkish universities to see if it complies with the rules and regulations. We manually collected 2409 
applicant data from 53 Turkish universities to see. Our aim is to see if applicants are ranked according 
to the rules suggested by the Higher Education Council of Turkey. The rulebook states that applicants 
should be ranked according to a final score based on the weighted average of their GPA (30%), 
graduate examination score (30%), academic examination score (30%), and foreign language skills 
score (10%). Thus, the research assistant selection is supposed to be a fair process where each applicant 
is evaluated based on objective metrics. However, our analysis of data suggests that the final score of 
the applicants is almost entirely based on the highly subjective academic examination conducted by 
the hiring institution. Thus, the applicants’ GPA, standardized graduate examination score, 
standardized foreign language score are irrelevant in the selection process, making it a very unfair 
process based on favoritism. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the Turkish Higher Education Law number 2547-33, a research assistant (RA) is 
defined as those whose primary duties are research, investigation, help with experiments, and other 
tasks given by relevant departments. RAs are appointed for a maximum of three years and can be 
reappointed as long as they are in good academic status. Thanks to the low responsibility of staying as 
a research assistant, most graduate students are reluctant to finish their studies because graduation 
means losing their relaxed lifestyle. Once they graduate, they need to find a job that pays slightly 
higher. There is only a negligible difference (10% or less) between the salary of an assistant professor 
and a research assistant. However, being an assistant professor comes with additional responsibilities 
such as teaching exhaustive hours to overcrowded classes with hundreds of registered students. 
The primary condition for being employed as a research assistant is to be a graduate student. You 
also need to enter the academic graduate student examination (ALES), which is a centralized Turkish 
version of GRE/GMAT exams. There is a minimum GPA requirement which depends on the faculty 
policy. There is also a foreign language requirement score of which is determined by the YOKDIL 
exam or equivalent score from similar exams. Finally, each department conducts a highly subjective 
academic exam (AE) to all applicants in the form of a written exam supposedly based on the 
departmental curriculum. Based on the Law of Higher Education 2547-50/d, the official guidelines set 
by the Higher Education Council dictate that the selection of RAs is based on the following semi-
centralized procedure: 
First, the hiring academic institutions announce their decision to employ new RAs by advertising 
these positions in the Official Gazette. The applicants send their application package directly to the 
hiring institution. It is a precondition to be of less than 35 years old and be a graduate student in good 
academic status. Any applicant should receive a minimum score of 70 out of 100 from the postgraduate 
studies examination (ALES). Another minimum requirement is to receive a grade of 50 or higher from 
a foreign language exam (YOKDIL or similar). Each institution has the right to increase the minimum 
scored for application. By law, it is mandatory to make the process as fair and as open possible. Thus, 
the law states explicitly that all institutions follow these guidelines to be equal opportunity employers.  
Once the hiring institution receives all applications within a given deadline, the applicants are 
ranked based on their exam results (60% of ALES and 40% of YOKDIL scores). After this first round 
evaluation, a minimum of 10 applications for each open position is invited for an academic 
examination. This examination is not centralized and each academic department is responsible for 
conducting its own exam. Although the law explicitly states that the exam should be relevant to the 
subject matter, objective, measurable, and auditable in its contents, in most cases its highly subjective 
where academic corruption is rampant.  
The final score of applicants is based on the following formula: 
Final Score = 30% ALES + 30% undergraduate GPA + 30% Academic Exam + 10% YOKDIL 
If the GPA is based on a 4-point scale, it is transformed into a 100-point scale using a formula 
determined by the Higher Education Council. This scaling ranges from 60 to 100 (i.e., GPA of 1 is 
converted as 60, and a GPA of 4 is converted as 100). The applicant who receives the highest score 
based on the above formula is formally invited for an employment contract. The second highest score 
is declared as the backup and is employed only if the highest scored applicant does not comply with 
the employment formalities on time.  
In this article, we test whether the RA selection is a fair process that follows the guidelines 
suggested by the authorities. Specifically, we are testing whether the final score is indeed based on the 
weighted average of individual scores (30% ALES, 30% undergraduate GPA, 30% Academic Exam, 
and 10% YOKDIL). The results of 428 academic exams are investigated using the hiring data from 53 
academic institutions. Specifically, we are looking to see whether the people who are offered 
employment contracts have higher academic status as measured by objective metrics, or whether they 
are chosen purely based on their score on academic examination results.  
2. Literature Review 
GPA is the primary indicator of students’ academic self-efficacy and motivation for achievement 
(French, Immekus, & Oakes, 2005; Robbins et al., 2004). Thus, high school grades are very indicators 
of university grades with almost one to one correlation. Even further, high school GPA and retention 
in the university are highly correlated (Rohr, 2012). Extending that logic to higher education, one 
would expect the university GPA to be reflective of the graduate education GPA. GPA is also believed 
to be a strong indicator of the abilities and productivity of the student. Some employers even put a 
minimum threshold on undergraduate GPA for new recruits (Sulastri, Handoko, & Janssens, 2015).  
Factors affecting the employee selection process has been a controversial issue for a long time. 
While this process is expected to be fair and objective, there are a variety of sociodemographic factors 
such as age, gender, affective in hiring (Haefner, 1977).  In academia, female workers may find it 
harder to quit their jobs or switch to better, potentially higher-paying positions (Reagan & Maynard, 
1974). Female and ethnic minority academicians are widely believed to have experience both explicit 
and implicit discrimination (Browne & Misra, 2003; Milkman, Akinola, & Chugh, 2012). Women in 
academia might face several challenges (Gulseven & Mostert, 2019; Mostert & Gulseven, 2019). 
Recent research on France suggests that those with French names are more likely to call for an 
interview compared to those with non-French sounding names (Edo, Jacquemet, & Yannelis, 2019). 
One of the primary causes of systematic discrimination is the recruitment methodology employed 
by universities (Pruitt & Isaac, 2006). Most universities use informal recruitment channels such as “old 
boy network” and alumni connections with limited use of advertising media. While it is more cost-
efficient to rely on such informal networks, the candidates come from a limited pool and the system is 
inherently biased towards the university’s own alumnus. The role of attractiveness is also a fascinating 
subject. Some research suggests that the hiring managers pay attention to the attractiveness of the 
applicant, putting the less attractive female applicants at a systematic disadvantage (Marlowe, 
Schneider, & Nelson, 1996).  
Only a few studies investigated the process of graduate student selection at selected universities to 
test the efficiency of the procedure (Arapgirlioglu, Zahal, Gurpinar, & Ozhan, 2014; Koğar, Sayin, & 
Assist, 2014; Öztürk & Anil, 2012). The common point in those studies is that the admission of 
students in the graduate education system in Turkey is unfair, where the admission interview is the 
primary determinant. We extend this study to the RA hiring process in Turkey, where the results also 
show that the RA selection process is also unfair.  
3. Data 
One of the reasons why there has not been any academic research conducted is the lack of data. A 
central database that includes the individual results at the individual selection level does not exist. 
Occasionally, some university departments become headlines due to the irregularities observed in their 
RA employee selections. This is when the RA selection data is well-publicized only for that specific 
academic examination result. Thanks to the law, it is also possible to find the same data at the webpages 
of hiring units. The data can be found in different forms: some departments release only the names of 
the hired RAs; some departments release only the names of the hired RAs and reserve RAs; some 
departments release both the names and detailed scores of hired RAs and reserved RAs. The form of 
data also shows wide diversity. While some departments post individual scores in original Excel form 
with detailed calculations, many departments post them in pdf form making it harder to retrieve.  
Given the wide variety in the quality and form of data, the only way left to collect reliable data is by 
manual collection. Thus, each data is collected manually from the websites of relevant institutions. The 
2019 Spring semester class of ECON 106 students helped with the data collection process. The initial 
database had a total of 2977 observations. However, 568 observations were deleted as these applicants 
did not take the academic examination, although they were invited to do so. The final dataset includes 
data on 2409 applicants who applied for the RA positions in 423 departments in 53 universities. 711 of 
those applicants applied for RA positions in engineering faculties.  
Each entry consists of the name, faculty, and department of the hiring institution, the name, surname, 
and gender of the applicant, the scores received from ALES, undergraduate GPA, YOKDIL, and 
academic exam, and the rank of the applicant among those who applied for the same RA position. In 
terms of gender, the data is well balanced.  
Table 1. Applicants based on their final status and gender 
  Frequency 
 Status Female Male Total 
Employed 272 258 530 
Fail 764 649 1413 
Reserve 243 223 466 
Total 1279 1130 2409 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, out of 2409 applicants, only 530 are offered employment contracts (About 
22%). While that number might seem very good, we need to consider that these are only reported 
numbers. Thus, among those who passed the first stage, the ratio of employed is about 10%. The data 
on those fails are missing due to either they do not attend the academic exam, or their score is not 
reported by the relevant institution.  
Table 2. Mean and Standard Z scores of applicants 
Mean Values 
Result ALES YOKDIL GPA AE 
Final 
Score 
Employ
ed 
81.98 80.12 81.37 70.16 78.01 
Fail 81.47 78.04 77.67 33.65 65.59 
Reserve 82.21 79.91 81.76 56.86 74.17 
TOTAL 81.72 78.86 79.27 46.18 69.98 
Z-Values 
Result ALES YOKDIL GPA AE 
Final 
Score 
Employ
ed 
0.09 0.19 0.22 1.15 1.21 
Fail -0.05 -0.13 -0.17 -0.49 -0.53 
Reserve 0.06 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.23 
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 2 shows the average scores of those who are employed, failed, and in the reserve list. The 
mean scores were almost the same as the median scores, so only mean scores are reported. There is a 
highly visible difference in the mean academic examination score between those who are employed 
(70.16), Fail (33.65), Reserve (56.86) failed. While the mean ALES, YOKDIL, and GPA scores are 
close, the employed applicants have higher average academic exam scores, which inflates their final 
score. Thus, the difference between those employed and failed is much more visible in the academic 
exam category.  
When the scores of those applicants in the fail and reserve list are compared, there are contradictory 
results. While one might expect that the applicants with higher GPA averages are more likely to be 
offered employment contracts, this is not the case. On the contrary, those in the reserve list have higher 
ALES and GPA scores than those in the employment list. YOKDIL scores of employed are negligibly 
higher than that of reserved. What is striking is that the outcome of the so-called academic examination 
is the primary factor that determines the allocation of applicants into different lists.  
The Z-scores within each examination are also calculated as each examination is separate, and the 
applicants are competing only with those who attend the same exam. The calculation of Z-scores is 
simply based on the difference between individual and examination-specific mean scores divided by 
the examination-specific standard deviation. Thus for applicant j, entering the examination i, the score 
is calculated according to the following formula: 
𝑍_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 =
𝑋𝑖𝑗 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑋𝑖)
𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣 (𝑋𝑖)
                            (1) 
When we measure the results in terms of standardized Z-Scores we observe almost the same 
outcomes. Those in the fail list have the lowest Z-scores in all dimensions. However, the employed 
applicants are not the top GPA earners. The average normalized GPA score of those in the reserve list 
is higher than the applicants who are offered employment. It is the academic examination results that 
determine who is employed and who is in the reserve list. 
4. Results 
Table 3 below lists which factors are correlated with the final score of the applicant. If it was a fair 
evaluation based on objective metrics, the correlation of ALES (30%), GPA (30%), YOKDIL (10%), 
and Academic Exam (30%) would be similar to their weights in score calculation. However, that is 
not the case, as observed below:  
Table 3. Correlation between employment factors  
Nominal Scores 
 ALES GPA YD AE Score 
ALES 1.00     
GPA 0.05 1.00    
YD 0.29 0.14 1.00   
AE 0.01 0.13 0.11 1.00  
Score 0.27 0.45 0.34 0.90 1.00 
Standardized Scores 
 ALES_Z GPA_Z YD_Z AE_Z Score_Z 
ALES_Z 1.00     
GPA_Z -0.07 1.00    
YD_Z -0.07 0.05 1.00   
AE _Z -0.02 0.06 0.13 1.00  
Score_Z 0.11 0.37 0.22 0.87 1.00 
The correlation analysis suggests that what the final score of the applicant is almost perfectly 
correlated with the result of the academic exam. The correlation between the final score and academic 
exam is 0.90 when measured in terms of nominal scores, and 0.87 when measured in terms of 
standardized scores. There is a moderate correlation between GPA and final score (0.45 and 0.37). 
ALES and YOKDIL scores seem relevant when they are measured in nominal terms, but this effect 
disappears when performance is measured in standardized scores. Thus the correlations with the final 
score can be ranked as follows: Subjective Academic Exam > Objective GPA > Objective YOKDIL 
> Objective ALES. 
The discriminant analysis has been performed using both nominal and standardized values. The 
linear model suggests that there is no significant difference between the two datasets, so only the 
standardized results are reported here. The linear model was able to classify 67% of the data into true 
groups. The correct classification rate of 84.5% is much higher when estimating those employed. The 
model correctly estimated 70.9% of the fails whereas that rate is only 35% when categorizing those on 
the reserve list.  
Table 4. Linear Discrimination 
 Employed Fail Reserve 
Constant -1.2765 -0.2540 -0.0904 
ALES_Z 0.2472 -0.1329 0.1211 
GPA_Z 0.3713 -0.2381 0.2992 
YOKDIL_Z 0.1286 -0.1060 0.1759 
Academic Exam_Z 2.1059 -0.9074 0.3510 
The linear discrimination factorial analysis in Table 4 above suggests that the score of the academic 
exam is distinctively highest among all groups, followed by GPA. YOKDIL score has the least effect 
on the outcome of who is employed and who fails the application, whereas ALES has the least effect 
on the outcome of the reserve list. Thus, whether an applicant is hired or not depends almost completely 
on what score s/he received in the subjective academic exam. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we discussed whether the employment of RAs is a fair and open process using 
statistical methods on sample data collected from individual hiring institutions in Turkey. According to 
the law, the applicants are ranked based on their final score, which is calculated as the weighted average 
of ALES, GPA, YOKDIL, and Academic Examination scores. By law, the weight of ALES, GPA, and 
Academic Examination is 30%, whereas YOKDIL has a weight of 10%. The hiring institution has no 
power on the calculation of ALES, GPA, and YOKDIL scores. However, the hiring committee prepares 
the questions for the academic examination and grades them according to applicants’ performance. This 
is where it is claimed that the hiring committee abuses its authority to determine who is hired and who 
is not. Thus, it is widely believed that the fair and mechanical process of ranking the applicants is flawed 
due to the magnified role of academic examination.  
In the linear discrimination model, the role of the academic exam is found to be distinctively higher 
than any other factor. The ordinal logistic regression has also been performed to test which factors affect 
the probability of someone being in the employment, reserve, or fail list. The results suggested that the 
ALES, GPA, and YOKDIL scores are not significant at all. It is purely the outcome of an academic 
exam that determines who is employed and who is in reserve or fail list.  
The statistical data analysis employed here leaves no doubt that the RA selection system in Turkey 
is inherently flawed. While in theory, it sounds like a fair process where the final rank is based on a 
mechanical formula, in practice, this is not the case. The results suggest that whether someone is 
employed or not depends purely on the highly subjective academic examination score which conducted 
and evaluated by the hiring department. It might be argued that the exam is fair and there is no evidence 
regarding the fairness of the exam. However, the data suggest a negative correlation between an 
applicant’s GPA and academic examination. The aim of the academic examination is to test the 
knowledge of the applicant in the subject matter. This knowledge is best reflected in the GPA of the 
applicant. A student takes about 40 to 50 courses during his/her studies. If each course has 3 exams, 
that means about 120 to 150 exams excluding the project work, quizzes, home works, presentations, 
etc. The outcome of these exams is reflected in the student’s GPA. Interestingly, the role GPA when 
employing an RA is almost negligible due to the dominance of the so-called academic examination.   
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